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- SNIFFER FAQ
-
- Version: 1.7
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- This Security FAQ is a resource provided by:
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- 5871 Glenridge Drive, Suite 115 Tel: (404) 252-7270
- Atlanta, Georgia 30328 Fax: (404) 252-2427
-
- - Internet Scanner ... the most comprehensive "attack simulator"
- available. -
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
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- _________________________________________________________________
-
- This Sniffer FAQ will hopefully give administrators a clear
- understanding of sniffing problems and hopefully possible solutions to
- follow up with. Sniffers is one of the main causes of mass break-ins
- on the Internet today.
-
- This FAQ will be broken down into:
- * What a sniffer is and how it works
- * Where are sniffers available
- * How to detect if a machine is being sniffed
- * Stopping sniffing attacks:
- + Active hubs
- + Encryption
- + Kerberos
- + One-time password technology
- + Non-promiscuous interfaces
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- What a sniffer is and how it works
-
- Unlike telephone circuits, computer networks are shared communication
- channels. It is simply too expensive to dedicate local loops to the
- switch (hub) for each pair of communicating computers. Sharing means
- that computers can receive information that was intended for other
- machines. To capture the information going over the network is called
- sniffing.
-
- Most popular way of connecting computers is through ethernet.
- Ethernet protocol works by sending packet information to all the
- hosts on the same circuit. The packet header contains the proper
- address of the destination machine. Only the machine with the
- matching address is suppose to accept the packet. A machine that is
- accepting all packets, no matter what the packet header says, is said
- to be in promiscuous mode.
-
- Because, in a normal networking environment, account and password
- information is passed along ethernet in clear-text, it is not hard
- for an intruder once they obtain root to put a machine into
- promiscuous mode and by sniffing, compromise all the machines on the
- net.
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- Where are sniffers available
-
- Sniffing is one of the most popular forms of attacks used by hackers.
- One special sniffer, called Esniff.c, is very small, designed to work
- on Sunos, and only captures the first 300 bytes of all telnet, ftp,
- and rlogin sessions. It was published in Phrack, one of the most
- widely read freely available underground hacking magazines. You can
- find Phrack on many FTP sites. Esniff.c is also available on many FTP
- sites such as coombs.anu.edu.au:/pub/net/log.
-
- You may want to run Esniff.c on an authorized network to quickly see
- how effective it is in compromising local machines.
-
- Other sniffers that are widely available which are intended to debug
- network problems are:
-
- * Etherfind on SunOs4.1.x
- * Snoop on Solaris 2.x and SunOs 4.1 (on ftp playground.sun.com)
- * Tcpdump 3.0 uses bpf for a multitude of platforms.
- * Packetman, Interman, Etherman, Loadman works on the following
- platforms:
- SunOS, Dec-Mips, SGI, Alpha, and Solaris. It is available on
- ftp.cs.curtin.edu.au:/pub/netman/[sun4c|dec-mips|sgi|alpha|solar
- is2]/
- [etherman-1.1a|interman-1.1|loadman-1.0|packetman-1.1].tar.Z
- Packetman was designed to capture packets, while Interman,
- Etherman, and Loadman monitor traffic of various kinds.
-
- DOS based sniffers
-
-
- * Gobbler for IBM DOS Machines
- * ethdump v1.03
- Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/inet/ethernet/ethdp103.zip
- * ethload v1.04
- Companion utility to a ethernet monitor. Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/monitoring/ethload/ethld104.z
- ip
-
-
-
- Commercial Sniffers are available at:
-
- * Klos Technologies, Inc.
-
- PacketView - Low cost network protocol analyzer
-
- Phone: 603-424-8300
- BBS: 603-429-0032
-
- * Network General.
-
- Network General produces a number of products. The most important
- are the Expert Sniffer, which not only sniffs on the wire, but also
- runs the packet through a high-performance expert system, diagnosing
- problems for you. There is an extension onto this called the
- "Distributed Sniffer System" that allows you to put the console to
- the expert sniffer on you Unix workstation and to distribute the
- collection agents at remote sites.
-
- * Microsoft's Net Monitor
-
- " My commercial site runs many protocols on one wire - NetBeui,
- IPX/SPX, TCP/IP, 802.3 protocols of various flavors, most notably
- SNA. This posed a big problem when trying to find a sniffer to
- examine the network problems we were having, since I found that some
- sniffers that understood Ethernet II parse out some 802.3 traffic as
- bad packets, and vice versa. I found that the best protocol parser
- was in Microsoft's Net Monitor product, also known as Bloodhound in
- its earlier incarnations. It is able to correctly identify such
- oddities as NetWare control packets, NT NetBios name service
- broadcasts, etc, which etherfind on a Sun simply registered as type
- 0000 packet broadcasts. It requires MS Windows 3.1 and runs quite
- fast on a HP XP60 Pentium box. Top level monitoring provides network
- statistics and information on conversations by mac address (or
- hostname, if you bother with an ethers file). Looking at tcpdump
- style details is as simple as clicking on a conversation. The filter
- setup is also one of the easiest to implement that I've seen, just
- click in a dialog box on the hosts you want to monitor. The number
- of bad packets it reports on my network is a tiny fraction of that
- reported by other sniffers I've used. One of these other sniffers in
- particular was reporting a large number of bad packets with src mac
- addresses of aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa but I don't see them at all using the
- MS product. - Anonymous
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- How to detect a sniffer running.
-
- To detect a sniffing device that only collects data and does not
- respond to any of the information, requires physically checking all
- your ethernet connections by walking around and checking the ethernet
- connections individually.
-
- It is also impossible to remotely check by sending a packet or ping
- if a machine is sniffing.
-
- A sniffer running on a machine puts the interface into promiscuous
- mode, which accepts all the packets. On some Unix boxes, it is
- possible to detect a promiscuous interface. It is possible to run a
- sniffer in non-promiscuous mode, but it will only capture sessions
- from the machine it is running on. It is also possible for the
- intruder to do similiar capture of sessions by trojaning many
- programs such as sh, telnet, rlogin, in.telnetd, and so on to write
- a log file of what the user did. They can easily watch the tty and
- kmem devices as well. These attacks will only compromise sessions
- coming from that one machine, while promiscuous sniffing compromises
- all sessions on the ethernet.
-
- For SunOs, NetBSD, and other possible BSD derived Unix systems, there
- is a command
-
- "ifconfig -a"
-
- that will tell you information about all the interfaces and if they
- are in promiscuous mode. DEC OSF/1 and IRIX and possible other OSes
- require the device to be specified. One way to find out what
- interface is on the system, you can execute:
-
- # netstat -r
- Routing tables
-
- Internet:
- Destination Gateway Flags Refs Use Interface
- default iss.net UG 1 24949 le0
- localhost localhost UH 2 83 lo0
-
-
- Then you can test for each interface by doing the following command:
-
- #ifconfig le0
- le0: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,NOTRAILERS,RUNNING,PROMISC,MULTICAST>
- inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 0xffffff00 broadcast 255.0.0.1
-
-
- Intruders often replace commands such as ifconfig to avoid detection.
- Make sure you verify its checksum.
-
- There is a program called cpm available on
- ftp.cert.org:/pub/tools/cpm that only works on Sunos and is suppose
- to check the interface for promiscuous flag.
-
- Ultrix can possibly detect someone running a sniffer by using the
- commands pfstat and pfconfig.
-
- pfconfig allows you to set who can run a sniffer
- pfstat shows you if the interface is in promiscuous mode.
-
- These commands only work if sniffing is enabled by linking it into the
- kernel. by default, the sniffer is not linked into the kernel. Most
- other Unix systems, such as Irix, Solaris, SCO, etc, do not have any
- flags indication whether they are in promiscuous mode or not,
- therefore an intruder could be sniffing your whole network and there
- is no way to detect it.
-
- Often a sniffer log becomes so large that the file space is all used
- up. On a high volume network, a sniffer will create a large load on
- the machine. These sometimes trigger enough alarms that the
- administrator will discover a sniffer. I highly suggest using lsof
- (LiSt Open Files) available from coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/Purdue/lsof
- for finding log files and finding programs that are accessing the
- packet device such as /dev/nit on SunOs.
-
- There is no commands I know of to detect a promiscuous IBM PC
- compatible machine, but they atleast usually do not allow command
- execution unless from the console, therefore remote intruders can not
- turn a PC machine into a sniffer without inside assistance.
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- Stopping sniffing attacks
-
- Active hubs send to each system only packets intended for it
- rendering promiscuous sniffing useless. This is only effective for
- 10-Base T.
-
- The following vendors have available active hubs:
-
- * 3Com
-
- * HP
-
-
-
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- ENCRYPTION
-
- There are several packages out there that allow encryption between
- connections therefore an intruder could capture the data, but could
- not decypher it to make any use of it.
-
- Some packages available are:
-
- * deslogin is one package available at ftp
- coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/tools/unix/deslogin .
-
- * swIPe is another package available at
- ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/swIPe/
-
- * Netlock encrypts all (tcp, udp, and raw ip based) communications
- transparently. It has automatic (authenticated Diffie-Helman)
- distibuted key management mechanism for each host and runs on the
- SUN 4.1 and HP 9.x systems. The product comes with a Certification
- Authority Management application which generates host certificates
- (X.509) used for authentication between the hosts. and provides
- centralized control of each Hosts communications rules.
-
- The product is built by Hughes Aircraft and they can be reached at
- 800-825-LOCK or email at netlock@mls.hac.com.
-
-
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- KERBEROS
-
-
-
- Kerberos is another package that encrypts account information going
- over the network. Some of its draw backs are that all the account
- information is held on one host and if that machine is compromised,
- the whole network is vulnerable. It is has been reported a major
- difficulty to set up. Kerberos comes with a stream-encrypting
- rlogind, and stream-encrypting telnetd is available. This prevents
- intruders from capturing what you did after you logged in.
-
- There is a Kerberos FAQ at ftp at rtfm.mit.edu in
- /pub/usenet/comp.protocols/kerberos/Kerberos_Users__Frequently_Asked_
- Questions_1.11
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- ONE TIME PASSWORD TECHNOLOGY
-
-
-
- S/key and other one time password technology makes sniffing account
- information almost useless. S/key concept is having your remote host
- already know a password that is not going to go over insecure
- channels and when you connect, you get a challenge. You take the
- challenge information and password and plug it into an algorithm
- which generates the response that should get the same answer if the
- password is the same on the both sides. Therefore the password never
- goes over the network, nor is the same challenge used twice. Unlike
- SecureID or SNK, with S/key you do not share a secret with the host.
- S/key is available on ftp:thumper.bellcore.com:/pub/nmh/skey
-
- Other one time password technology is card systems where each user
- gets a card that generates numbers that allow access to their account.
- Without the card, it is improbable to guess the numbers.
-
- The following are companies that offer solutions that are provide
- better password authenication (ie, handheld password devices):
-
-
- Secure Net Key (SNK)
-
- Digital Pathways, Inc.
- 201 Ravendale Dr. Mountainview, Ca.
- 97703-5216 USA
-
- Phone: 415-964-0707 Fax: (415) 961-7487
-
-
- Secure ID
-
- Security Dynamics,
- One Alewife Center
- Cambridge, MA 02140-2312
- USA Phone: 617-547-7820
- Fax: (617) 354-8836
- Secure ID uses time slots as authenication rather than
- challenge/response.
-
-
- ArKey and OneTime Pass
-
- Management Analytics
- PO Box 1480
- Hudson, OH 44236
- Email: fc@all.net
- Tel:US+216-686-0090 Fax: US+216-686-0092
-
- OneTime Pass (OTP):
- This program provides unrestricted one-time pass codes on a user by
- user basis without any need for cryptographic protocols or hardware
- devices. The user takes a list of usable pass codes and scratches out
- each one as it is used. The system tracks usage, removing each
- passcode from the available list when it is used. Comes with a very
- small and fast password tester and password and pass phrase generation
- systems.
-
- ArKey:
- This is the original Argued Key system that mutually authenticates
- users and systems to each other based on their common knowledge. No
- hardware necessary. Comes with a very small and fast password tester
- and password and pass phrase generation systems.
-
- WatchWord and WatchWord II
-
- Racal-Guardata
- 480 Spring Park Place
- Herndon, VA 22070
- 703-471-0892
- 1-800-521-6261 ext 217
-
-
- CRYPTOCard
-
- Arnold Consulting, Inc.
- 2530 Targhee Street, Madison, Wisconsin
- 53711-5491 U.S.A.
- Phone : 608-278-7700 Fax: 608-278-7701
- Email: Stephen.L.Arnold@Arnold.Com
- CRYPTOCard is a modern, SecureID-sized, SNK-compatible device.
-
-
- SafeWord
-
- Enigma Logic, Inc.
- 2151 Salvio #301
- Concord, CA 94520
- 510-827-5707 Fax: (510)827-2593
- For information about Enigma ftp to: ftp.netcom.com in directory
- /pub/sa/safeword
-
-
- Secure Computing Corporation:
-
- 2675 Long Lake Road
- Roseville, MN 55113
- Tel: (612) 628-2700
- Fax: (612) 628-2701
- debernar@sctc.com
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- NON-PROMISCUOUS INTERFACES
-
-
-
- You can try to make sure that most IBM DOS compatible machines have
- interfaces that will not allow sniffing. Here is a list of cards that
- do not support promiscuous mode:
-
- Test the interface for promiscuous mode by using the Gobbler. If you
- find a interface that does do promiscuous mode and it is listed
- here, please e-mail cklaus@iss.net so I can remove it ASAP.
-
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (short card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (long card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Busmaster Server Adapter/A
-
- The following cards are rumoured to be unable to go into promiscuous
- mode, but that the veracity of those rumours is doubtful.
-
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27250A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27245A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27247A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27248A EtherTwist EISA PC LAN Adapter Card/32
- HP 27247B EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP 27252A EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP J2405A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter NC/16 TP
-
- Adapters based upon the TROPIC chipset generally do not support
- promiscuous mode. The TROPIC chipset is used in IBM's Token Ring
- adapters such as the 16/4 adapter. Other vendors (notably 3Com) also
- supply TROPIC based adapters. TROPIC-based adapters do accept special
- EPROMs, however, that will allow them to go into promiscuous mode.
- However, when in promiscuous mode, these adapters will spit out a
- "Trace Tool Present" frame.
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
-
- I would like to thank the following people for the contribution to
- this FAQ that has helped to update and shape it:
- * Padgett Peterson (padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com)
- * Steven Bellovin (smb@research.att.com)
- * Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
- * Robert D. Graham (robg@NGC.COM)
- * Kevin Martinez (kevinm@beavis.qntm.com)
- * Frederick B. Cohen (fc@all.net)
- * James Bonfield (jkb@mrc-lmb.cam.ac.uk)
- * Marc Horowitz (marc@MIT.EDU)
- * Steve Edwards (steve@newline.com)
- * Andy Poling (Andy.Poling@jhu.edu)
- * Jeff Collyer (jeff@cnet-pnw.com)
- * Sara Gordon (sgordon@sun1.iusb.indiana.edu)
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- COPYRIGHT
-
- This paper is Copyright (c) 1994, 1995
- by Christopher Klaus of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
-
-
-
- Permission is hereby granted to give away free copies electronically.
- You may distribute, transfer, or spread this paper electronically. You
- may not pretend that you wrote it. This copyright notice must be
- maintained in any copy made. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
- part of this paper in any other medium (ie magazines, books, etc)
- excluding electronic medium, please ask the author for permission.
-
- DISCLAIMER
-
-
-
- The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of
- this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
- There are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event
- shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of
- or in connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use
- of this information is at the user's own risk.
-
- ADDRESS OF AUTHOR
-
-
-
- Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
- Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- <iss@iss.net>
-
-
-
- INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc, located in Atlanta, Ga., specializes
- in the developement of security scanning software tools. Its flagship
- product, Internet Scanner, is software that learns an organization's
- network and probes every device on that network for security holes. It
- is the most comprehensive "attack simulator" available, checking for
- over 100 security vulnerabilities.
-